Séminaire COURNOT – Françoise Forges (Univ. Paris Dauphine)
Du 09/04/2021 au 09/06/2021
De 14:00 à 15:30
Détails de l'événement :
“Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval : the single crossing case”
Résumé : We consider a sender-receiver game, in which the sender has nitely many types and the receiver’s decision is a real number. We assume that utility functions are concave, single-peaked and single-crossing. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a decision, which requires the sender’s approval to be implemented. Otherwise, the sender “exits”. At a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium without exit, the receiver must maximize his expected utility subject to the participation constraints of all positive probability types. This necessary condition may not hold at the receiver’s prior belief, so that a non-revealing equilibrium may fail to exist. Similarly, a fully revealing equilibrium may not exist either due to the sender’s incentive compatibility conditions. We propose a constructive algorithm that always achieves a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium without exit. Under appropriate assumptions, the outcome of the algorithm is unique and satis es properties which are worth of interest, already when the sender’s approval is not an issue.