Séminaire COURNOT – Paul Pezanis-Christou (University of Adelaide)

Détails de l'événement :

Titre : Overcoming strategic ambiguity in first-price and all-pay auctions: a decision-making approach with experimental insights

Résumé : We propose an impulse balance equilibrium approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions that assumes no profit-maximization and minimal beliefs about others’ behavior (no one bids more than ones’ value). This approach alleviates strategic ambiguity, and its parameter-free variant entails the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for risk neutral bidders. Its parametric variant involves impulse weighting and/or loss aversion, and may lead to under- or overbidding in either auction format. It is flexible enough to accommodate probability misperceptions, risk aversion and asymmetric preferences. We assess the explanatory power of this approach with experimental data on all-pay auctions and find that it outperforms the available game-theoretic models. It also rationalizes the observation of ‘bifurcating’ bidding strategies in terms of a-insensitivity, a marker of strategic ambiguity.

Lieu du séminaire : Salle C 205 et ZOOM

Lien ZOOM : https://cnrs.zoom.us/j/97276230894?pwd=UmJiVE1mQ2ljQTJqdFRQZFpUanZjZz09

Agenda des séminaires : https://www.beta-economics.fr//seminaires-cournot-2022-2023/