Title : Delegation in the family
Author(s) : J.M. Baland, M. Boltz, C. Guirkinger, A. Jolivet, R. Ziparo
Abstract : Non-participation in household decisions is commonly interpreted as weak empowerment. We challenge this interpretation by showing that non-participation can be a strategic choice — a form of delegation — when a spouse expects the decision outcome to be sufficiently close to her preferences regardless of her involvement. We propose a model of imperfect information and derive conditions under which delegation arises in equilibrium: it occurs when the opportunity cost of participation in the decision is large compared to the preference gap between spouses. A key implication is that the spouse who receives authority may achieve lower welfare than the one who delegates. We test these predictions in two incentivized experiments conducted among couples in Belgium/France and Benin, finding strong support across both contexts. Survey evidence further confirms the external validity of the results. Our findings suggest that standard survey measures of intra-household bargaining, by conflating strategic delegation with disempowerment, may incorrectly reflect the distribution of power within households.
Key-words : intra-household decisions, collective model, delegation, household experiment.
JEL Classification : D13, O12
